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Abstract 
 
 The AES is a standard encryption algorithm used in numerous cryptographic systems like smart cards, TPMs as well as in 
protocols like WPA2 or OpenSSL. Measuring the robustness of AES implementations against physical attacks is of utmost importance in 
order to guarantee the security of the system into which the AES is used. In this article, we describe how a hardware AES, embedding 
countermeasures against physical attacks, has been characterized using a laser. With the latter, we tried to implement a class of 
physical attacks called fault attacks which, when successful, could have helped us retrieve the secret key used by the AES module. Our 
experiments have allowed us to validate the efficiency of some of the countermeasures implemented in this AES implementation and 
have given us hints on how to further improve them. 
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1. Introduction 
 Security, through the authenticity, confidentiality and integrity of communication systems, has become 
an essential component of all electronic systems. The vulnerability to attacks of the devices implementing the 
cryptographic algorithms (such as smart cards) has become a critical issue. Some malicious means or 
"physical attacks" could be used to retrieve sensitive information such as encryption keys and therefore 
lower the security of the whole protected transmission chain of information. There are three types of physical 
attacks: invasive attacks, which cover all the techniques based on the “physical” analysis, modification 
(ANDERSON 1998) and probing (HANDSCHUH 1999, SCHMIDT 2009, GAMMEL 2010) of integrated 
circuits (IC) by an invasive method (KÖMMERLING 1999, KOEUNE 2005); observation or passive attacks 
which exploit the fact that some physical characteristics such as power consumption (KOCHER 1999, LU 
2010) , electromagnetic radiation or the duration of computation depends on the chip’s internal calculations 
(KOEUNE 2005); perturbation or fault attacks, which are based on changing environmental conditions of the 
chip. The latter ones are the most complex to implement as various and complex parameters must be taken 
into account such as the timing (i.e. the synchronization between the injection time and the calculation), the 
localization and the power level. 
 In this paper we mainly discuss about characterisations based on fault attacks. One of the goals of such 
attacks could be to reveal the secret keys of a cryptographic device based on techniques like Differential 
Fault Analysis (DFA) (BIHAM 1997, BONEH 1997). Several methods can be used to induce faults into 
cryptographic integrated circuits: use of a laser (SKOROBOGATOV 2005, BAR-EL 2006), voltage pulses 
(BLÖMER 2003), clock glitches (AGOYAN 2010) or electromagnetic (EM) disturbances (SCHMIDT 2007). 
The use of lasers is one of the most effective techniques: lasers allow a good reproducibility, an accurate 
control on the timing of the injection (the instant of firing and the duration of the pulse) and a precise 
focalization (the location and the penetration of the fault).  Consequently, lasers generate precise local 
effects onto the IC, thus ‘protecting’ the remaining chip against unwanted perturbations.  Several theoretical 
attacks against cryptographic algorithms are based on such models of fault injection methods (PIRET 2003, 
GIRAUD 2005, 2010, MORADI 2010).  Although protections against these kinds of attacks exist (YEN 2006), 
advanced methods combine semi-invasive attacks and power or EM analysis (MORADI, 2011). 
 We hereby describe the security assessment of an AES hardware chip done to validate the efficiency of 
the embedded countermeasures that could be incorporated into the AES module of the SECRICOM’s secure 
docking station (SDM). The SDM contains authentication keys and access rights associated with each user 
of the SECRICOM secure communication network. To access such keys, a secure channel, based on AES 
encryption, has to be established between the SDM and the host. Hence, guaranteeing the resistance of the 
AES used against physical attacks helps in hardening the security chain of SECRICOM’s communication 
infrastructure.  
 The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we recall the physical phenomena occurring when a laser is 
used to inject a fault into an IC. Then we describe the AES implementation used as target of our laser-based 
characterization. Third, we provide a description of the laser-based tests made on the targeted AES. With 
attacks like those described in (PIRET 2003, GIRAUD 2005) in mind, we tested the countermeasure in a 
“black box” approach (i.e. without using the knowledge we had of the implemented countermeasures). We 
also tested the AES in a “white box” approach where we tried to take advantage of the knowledge we had of 
the implemented countermeasures in order to circumvent them. Finally we provide a discussion about the 
results that we obtained and the conclusions that could be drawn from them.  
2. Physical phenomena induced by lasers into an IC 
 When an IC is exposed to a laser beam, two phenomena have to be considered: the photoelectric effect 
appearing and the fact that some parts of the IC are more sensitive than others. When a laser beam strikes 
the silicon and that the photon’s energy is higher than the Silicon’s band gap, electron-hole pairs are created. 
In general, these pairs recombine and there is no effect on the IC but under specific conditions, some 
undesired effects can appear. We shall focus on one of those effects called the Single Event Effect (SEE).
  
1.1. Single Event Effect 
 A Single Event Effect can appear when the electron-hole pairs created by the laser beam are drifted in 
opposite directions by the electrical field instead of immediately recombining. The consequence of that is the 
creation of a transient current as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Laser beam effect onto MOS structure 
 
Fig. 2: Transient current from charge collection after 
laser shoot
  
 Along the laser beam shown in Figure 1, after the creation of the electron-hole pairs, two collection 
phenomena lead to the creation of the transient current. The first phenomenon stretches the depletion region 
(hence the extension of the electric field) along the laser beam and within a few picoseconds, charges are 
collected giving a current peak. In a second time, the rest of the charges are collected in a longer diffusing 
scheme. Figure 2 shows the transient current associated with the two phenomena of collection as given in 
(Wang 2008).  
 
1.2. Sensitive zones 
 In CMOS technology, some parts are more sensitive than others to SEEs. Indeed, to create an SEE, 
and then a fault, a strong electric field is needed. The reverse biased PN-junctions of the chip provide this 
required electric field. The position of these junctions can change, depending on the value of the data 
manipulated.   
 A good example to illustrate this data dependency is the CMOS inverter. The first case is a high state on 
the inverter’s input: the NMOS transistor is in ON state, its drain is grounded, the source and the bulk too and 
there is no reverse biased PN-junction. The PMOS transistor is in OFF state, then its source and the N well 
are in high potential, but its drain is grounded giving rise to a reverse biased junction. Hence, the drain of the 
PMOS transistor becomes sensitive to a laser shoot. In the same way, with a low state on the inverter’s 
input, the drain of the NMOS transistor becomes sensitive to a laser shoot. 
 Figure 3(a) shows an inverter with a low state on its input and the sensitive zone associated. The 
second inverter (b) on the figure represents the other case of localisation of a sensitive zone. 
 
Fig. 3: CMOS inverter with a low state (a) or high state (b) on its input 
 
1.3. From SEE to faults 
We showed in the previous sections how a laser beam can create single events into CMOS structures and 
which parts of it are more sensitive to a laser. Even if an SEE is created by a laser, it is possible that the SEE 
has no effect on the chip. An SEE can be transformed into a fault in two different ways. The first one is to 
generate an SEE directly into a register, then its state is changed and this change is stored and propagated. 
The second way consists in creating, into the chip’s logic, an SEE which propagates into the logic until the 
next register. Depending on the timing, if the SEE reaches the register’s input on a clock’s rising edge, an 
incorrect value will be latched. Thus, a fault is injected into the chip’s computation. Figure 4 illustrates the 
propagation of a SEE into the logic and the difficulty of transforming it into a fault. In the first case, the SEE 
generated into the logic is not captured by the D flip flop of the register cell and has no significant effect on 
the data processed. In the second case, with the perfect timing, the SEE is captured by the D flip flop. Thus, 
the value of the register is changed, the SEE has been turned into a fault. 
 
Fig. 4: Propagation of SEE into Logic 
2. The hardened AES test chip 
 In this section, we describe the chip used as a device under test (DuT) for our laser-based 
characterizations. The DuT is a hardware module implementing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
algorithm used, for example, for encrypting the secure channel between a SECRICOM host device and the 
SECRICOM SDM.  
 
2.1. The AES algorithm 
 The AES algorithm is a symmetric key cryptography standard established by the NIST (NIST 2001). This 
algorithm is based on a few transformations (SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey) used 
iteratively in rounds (Figure 5). In this paper, we focus on the 128-bit key version. This version processes 
data blocks of 128 bits, considered as matrices of 4x4 bytes called States, in ten rounds. The round keys (K1 
to K10) used during each round, are calculated by a key expansion routine (not detailed in this paper). We 
denote M1 to M10 the AES States at the end of each round. 
 
Fig. 5: The AES algorithm and its hardware implementation 
 
2.2. The secure ASIC AES  
 In our study, we use the secure AES test chip described in (AGOYAN 2011) implemented in HCMOS9gp 
130nm STM technology. The size of the die is 1336µm x 1411.8µm and its working frequency is 25MHz. A 
picture of the chip is shown in Fig. 10. 
 The countermeasure against faults attacks implemented in this chip consists first in detecting errors and 
then reacting in case of detection. The error detection is done by using spatial duplication: the AES is 
executed twice in parallel and at each round, the results of the two instances are compared. If an error is 
detected, the reaction consists in blurring the erroneous cipher text with the scrambled value of the detected 
error. The error detection mechanism is described in the following section. 
 The figure below presents an overview of the ASIC AES architecture. We can see the two AES executed 
in parallel with the error detection system. The AES is interfaced with an AMBA APB bus to communicate 
with the external world. We used an FPGA for the interface between the APB bus and the PC used to control 
the AES and perform the different tests.  
 
Fig. 6: Overview of the ASIC AES architecture 
 
2.3. The error detection mechanism 
 As mentioned in the previous section, when an error is detected (XNOR operation between the two 
paths), the error detection mechanism scrambles the error value and then blurs the cipher text with the 
scrambled error. An error matrix is used whereby the error is spread across the rows and the columns as 
shown in the Figure 7. After that, the error matrix is XORed with the SubByte’s results of the two data paths.  
 
       
Fig. 7: The Error Detection and Spreading Mechanism 
 
 
2.4. The Cross-ShiftRows operation 
 In addition to the above error detection mechanism, the ShiftRows operation is crossed between the two 
data paths. Half of the bits of each byte come from the other path and vice versa. This “crossing” operation is 
an additional security barrier. Indeed, if a fault is injected onto one of the paths, the fault is detected and 
propagated onto the two paths in parallel. With the Cross-ShiftRows, half of information is lost due to the 
transfer to the other path. Figure 8 illustrates the injection of a fault on the last round of the AES and its 
propagation throughout the two data paths. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Propagation of a fault on the last AES round (with the countermeasures) 
 
 
3. Fault injection using laser 
 
3.1. The Laser test bench 
 To perform the different tests on the AES chip, we used the laser facility of the MicroPackS™ platform 
(MICROPACKS 2012). This laser is a YAG (Yttrium Aluminium Garnet) laser with three different 
wavelengths: green, infra-red and ultra-violet. We used the green wavelength (~532nm) with a 20x Mitutoyo 
lens. We obtained a spot size between 1µm and 150µm. With the larger spot size, we have an energy of 
approximately 15pJ per laser shoot. 
 The AES is interfaced with a control PC. When an encryption is launched, a trigger signal is sent to an 
FPGA synchronization board, which sends a shoot signal to the laser after a delay defined by the control PC. 
This delay allows triggering the laser at different times during the encryption. 
 We put ourselves into two configurations when doing those tests. In the first configuration we adopted a 
“black box” approach where we ignored any of the implementation information we had on the DuT and tried 
to perform fault injections on the data path of the AES, in the ‘classical one’, with the objective of collecting 
the erroneous ciphertexts and doing differential cryptanalysis like in Giraud’s or Piret’s methods. In the 
second configuration, we used our knowledge of the implemented countermeasures, in a so-called “white 
box” approach, to try to circumvent the security mechanism by, say, trying to fault the detection mechanism 
itself. 
 
3.2. Fault injection on the data path 
 The easiest way to generate errors and trigger the detection mechanism is to inject faults into the 
register of the SubByte module. Despite the propagation of the error onto the two data paths and the loss of 
half of the information due to the Cross-ShiftRows, we can always try to use the faulty ciphertexts in Giraud’s 
DFA (GIRAUD 2005). The sine-qua-none condition for this attack is to generate mono-bit faults (i.e. errors on 
only one bit of the State matrix). The error matrix can be found with a simple XOR operation between the 
correct ciphertext and the faulty one. Figure 8 illustrates this kind of fault injection. 
 
3.3. Fault injection on the detection mechanism 
  Another way of generating errors is to use the error detection mechanism itself. The DFA described in 
(PIRET 2003) needs a fault injection before the last MixColumns operation (Round 9). With our 
countermeasures and a fault injection on the data path, the faulty ciphertexts are not exploitable for this 
attack. When looking closer at the Cross-ShiftRows operation, it appears that if the same fault is injected on 
the two data paths, the effect of the Cross-ShiftRows is “neutralized”. Due to the dispersion of the lay-out of 
the two paths in all the chip’s surface, it’s very hard to inject the same fault into the two paths with a laser 
which has a local effect. The solution is to inject the fault directly into the error matrix. By doing so, we could 
propagate the same error on the two paths and the Cross-ShiftRows is neutralized and we do not have any 
loss of information. In the last round, as the errors are the same on the two data paths, no detection appears 
and we have a faulty ciphertext that could be used for DFA. Figure 9 depicts the propagation onto the two 
paths of an error injected directly into the error matrix at the 9th round. 
  
Figure 9: Injection of an error into the error matrix and its propagation 
 
4. Laser tests on the AES chip 
 
4.1. Localization of the SubByte’s registers 
 Since the registers of the SubByte are dispersed across the ASIC, the first step of the characterization 
work was to physically localize those registers. To do so, we made a cartography using the laser. The 
surface of the chip was partitioned into 36 zones of size 150µm x 150µm each as shown in Figure 10. For 
each zone, 50 different encryptions were performed among which we looked for specific faulty ciphertexts. 
Indeed, as shown in the Figure 8, if a fault is injected on one byte at the beginning of the last round, in the 
end, we have six times the same error, due to the propagation mechanism, and one different error at the 
position of the injected fault. In Figure 10, the colored the regions highlight those where specific faulty 
ciphertexts were obtained and which appeared to be more sensitive to this type of fault on the last round of 
encryption.    
  
 
 Fig. 10: Sensitive areas of the ASIC 
 
4.2. Results 
 Once the SubByte’s registers have been localized, we first injected faults on the data path. In the “black 
box” approach, we tried to perform DFA as described in (GIRAUD 2005) using only the faulty and correct 
ciphertexts but in vain: the detection and error spreading mechanism proved to be efficient against such 
attacks. 
 However, when we used the knowledge of the implementation of the countermeasure (i.e. in a “white 
box” approach), especially the structure of the Cross-ShiftRows, we managed to recover a few bytes of the 
secret key of the AES. The complete knowledge of the Cross-ShiftRows is necessary because half of the 
information is lost in this operation and we need, for the attack, to keep all the information. 
 We also tried to inject faults directly on the error matrix in order to try another type of DFA (PIRET 2003) 
where in theory two faulty ciphertexts are needed to recover 4 bytes of the secret key. To find all the 16 bytes 
of the key, we need to inject an error on one of the bytes of each column of the error matrix. Despite our 
effort, we couldn’t inject a fault on the error matrix with the laser test bench. One of the reasons is that the 
error matrix is not implemented with registers but with logic gates. Thus it’s very hard to synchronize the 
laser shoot with the ASIC’s encryption precisely enough to target separately each column of the error matrix.  
5. Discussion & Conclusion 
 In this paper, we have described how countermeasures implemented in a hardware implementation of 
the AES have been tested using a laser as fault injection means. We have seen that, in a “black box” 
approach, classical DFA techniques are inefficient against such countermeasures. However our 
characterization work has also shown that in a “white box” scenario, some bytes of the secret keys could be 
recovered. This has led us to the conclusion that the error propagation should have been truly random and 
independent from the generated errors (requiring the implementation of a True Random Number Generator 
on the chip). Moreover, another investigated attack path, trying to inject a fault on the error matrix itself, has 
proven to be unsuccessful illustrating the limits of current equipment with respect to current technologies. 
Such characterization works have provided valuable design rules for implementing secure encryption AES 
modules like those used in the SDM of the SECRICOM project. 
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